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New Governance and the Case of Activation Policies:
Comparing Experiences in Denmark and the Netherlandsspol_ ..
Colin Lindsay and Ronald W. McQuaid
Abstract
This article explores the importance of new forms of governance in active labour market policies
(activation) in two countries: Denmark and the Netherlands. Drawing on research with key
stakeholders in these countries, we analyse how new governance, and particularly processes of
contracting-out and localization, have found expression in recent reforms to activation. We conclude
that localization and contracting-out may have a future role to play in the development of more
locally responsive and individually focused services. But both countries have encountered problems
in promoting joined-up services through local jobcentres, while contracting-out has not always led
to the tailored, individually focused services envisaged by policy-makers. In both countries, there are
also concerns that the restriction of the Public Employment Service to a ‘gatekeeping and signposting’
role will lead to inconsistencies in the quality of services, exposing the most disadvantaged to greater
social risk.
Keywords
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Introduction
‘New governance’ has emerged as a crucial element of governments’ attempts
to increase the effectiveness and reach of public services. The new governance
agenda has gained a particularly strong foothold in those policy arenas where
rapidly changing demands have led to the restructuring of welfare institutions.
In these cases, the new governance has been seen as a means of developing less
state-dominated modes of welfare provision and/or promoting network-based
approaches to organizing collaborative action, these rationales in turn reflect-
ing an acceptance that the state does not always have the capacities and
competence to act alone in addressing complex social problems (Daly ).
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Among advocates of such approaches, there is agreement that the new gov-
ernance has the potential to improve services by: encouraging more flexible
organization and the decentralization of decision-making; including a wider
range of stakeholders with specific expertise in the planning and delivery of
provision; and tapping the dynamism of the private sector (see Van Berkel and
Borghi  for discussion).
The organization of active labour market programmes and services
(hereafter ‘activation’) is one area of welfare reform where new forms of
governance have gained particular prominence.With ‘general’ unemployment
falling in many EU states since , policy-makers’ attentions have increas-
ingly turned to the problems of unemployed and inactive people perceived to be
‘harder to reach’. There is an acceptance that those further from the labour
market require tailored (rather than standardized) services that respond to the
specific combination of barriers faced by each individual. Similarly, there is an
acknowledgement of the need for activation programmes that reflect the
dynamics and particular problems of regional and local labour markets.
Accordingly, successive formulations of the European Employment
Strategy (EES) have emphasized the need to build locally responsive, multi-
agency approaches to address the complex needs of workless people (see, for
example, CEC ). Alongside an emphasis on partnership-working, the
EES has pointed to the need for a ‘progressive de-monopolization’ of Public
Employment Service (PES) provision (CEC ). Within this context,
two specific processes – both key tenets of new governance – have become
increasingly prominent in activation and employment services in many
countries: the contracting-out of interventions once delivered by the PES;
and the devolution of governance, management and delivery to regional
and local partnerships.
Drawing on a review of literature and in-depth case study interviews, this
article examines the emergence of new forms of governance, and especially
processes of contracting-out and regional/local devolution in activation, in
two EU states: Denmark and the Netherlands. The article specifically assesses
the extent to which different approaches to localization and contracting-out
have delivered benefits in terms of more locally responsive and individually-
focused services. Denmark and the Netherlands provide an appropriate focus
for this research. Both are often seen as among the vanguard of ‘active’
welfare states (they have seen the rapid expansion of activation since the
mid-s); and they have reported significant declines in unemployment
during the same period. Both countries have been held up as examples of best
practice in responding to unemployment – ‘Stories of the Danish and Dutch
employment miracles serve to disseminate supply-side policy paradigms
throughout Western Europe’ (Daguerre : ). Yet while the two countries’
welfare states share some similar corporatist features, there are considerable
differences in their broader welfare and labour market structures; and while
both have pursued localization and contracting-out in reforming the gover-
nance of activation, the approaches that they have adopted have varied
considerably (particularly in relation to the privatization of PES functions).
Comparing the diverse approaches, and identifying the shared experiences, of
these different countries can therefore offer important lessons for policy.
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Following this introduction, the next section of the article reviews the
literature on new governance in activation, and how these ideas are repre-
sented in the recent reforms to employment services in Denmark and the
Netherlands. The following sections report the findings of research under-
taken in Denmark and the Netherlands, respectively. Finally, drawing on the
preceding analysis, we present conclusions and consider implications for
policy.
New Governance in Activation
The EES provides the overarching framework for the coordination of employ-
ment policy across EU states. The implementation of ‘active and preventative
measures’ to improve the employability of unemployed and economically
inactive groups and ‘the modernization and strengthening of labour market
institutions, notably employment services’ in order to achieve this remain key
elements of the EES (CEC : ). The development of locally responsive,
multi-agency approaches is seen as important to improving the effectiveness of
activation in addressing the often complex needs of individual job-seekers and
disadvantaged communities.
This focus on locally responsive, multi-agency partnership working has been
combined within the EES (and the National Reform Programmes of many
states) with a commitment to increasing ‘contestability’ in relation to the
services traditionally provided by government-funded PES agencies. European
Commission statements have called for a ‘progressive de-monopolization’
of public activation and employment services, while suggesting that PES
organizationsmust ‘definemore clearly what their proper role and added value
in the market is, compared to both commercial and non-commercial service
providers’ (CEC : ).
Reforms that have followed at the national level have seen a shift towards
new forms of governance – a ‘new state-market-civil society mix’ (Van
Berkel and Van der Aa ) – in the planning and provision of activa-
tion across a range of different welfare models. New forms of governance
in activation have generally been characterized by (Borghi and Van
Berkel a): decentralization of planning and management from central
government to regional/local institutions; the promotion of inter-agency
cooperation between government institutions (for example, the integration
of benefits administration and employment services), levels of government,
and public and non-governmental actors; and the increasing use of
contracting-out as a means of including new stakeholders in the delivery of
services.
Our research specifically focused on processes of contracting-out and
regional/local devolution. As we will see, both countries have seen profound
changes towards the establishment of regional and local partnerships, whether
in the form of tripartite planning structures (which until recently played a key
role in the governance of activation in Denmark), or integrated, multi-agency
jobcentres. Both have also experimented with contracting-out. Indeed, for
Van Berkel and Borghi (: ) ‘the cases of the Netherlands and Denmark
exemplify’ how ‘the introduction of market mechanisms in the provision of
S P & A, V. , No. , O 
©  The Author(s) 
Journal Compilation ©  Blackwell Publishing Ltd
activation services is taking place . . . not only [in] those [countries] tradition-
ally characterized as liberal welfare states’.
However, it is unclear whether concurrent processes of regional devolution
and local partnership development on the one hand, and contracting-out on
the other, are always complementary or even compatible. Lindsay et al. ()
argue that the ‘capacity for mutualism and co-operation’ is essential to effec-
tive local collaboration on activation – those involved need to have both the
authority and institutional flexibility to engage in mutual decision-making and
the sharing of resources and ‘ownership’ during programme development.
Contracting-out can sometimes appear to run counter to the building of such
shared ownership, especially if contractual models are highly centralized. For
example, in the UK activation providers and other stakeholders have con-
sistently pointed to the barriers to ‘partnering’ thrown up by the PES’s
over-reliance on centralized contracting models, which are defined by rigid
performance targets and limit the flexibility of PES managers to target
resources at local level.
Furthermore, it has been suggested that ‘trust and solidarity’-based rela-
tionships are central to the success of genuine partnership working, and
that contracting-out, which enforces obligations based on unequal power,
represents a different form of relationship (Powell and Dowling ). As
Bredgaard and Larsen () note, the tension between public purchasers’
attempts to ensure transparent markets and the need for ‘partnership and
dialogue’ (defined by a relationship of trust) has emerged as a recurring feature
of the reform of activation in many EU states.
To what extent have Denmark and the Netherlands seen the emergence of
new forms of governance in activation, especially in relation to processes of
contracting-out and regional/local devolution? Have different approaches to
localization and contracting-out delivered benefits in terms of more locally
responsive and individually focused services? What are the broader implica-
tions of recent reforms, with reference to the role of the PES and the inclusion
of other stakeholders in the planning and delivery of activation? The discus-
sion below seeks to address these issues by reporting the findings of case
study research involving national, regional and local stakeholders in the two
countries.
Denmark: From Regional Partnerships to Integrated
Jobcentres
Background
The origins of Denmark’s current activation policy framework can to some
extent be traced to the country’s prolonged economic crisis of the s.
Special ‘job and education offer programmes’ were gradually developed
during the s, but progress towards the activation of the unemploy-
ment regime remained limited, with the conservative-led government’s
‘underclass’-type rhetoric rarely matched with hard policy proposals (Lindsay
and Mailand ). However, the election of a centre-left coalition saw the
development of an extensive series of activation programmes from . A
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further labour market reform took effect in  (this time under a liberal-led
coalition), which saw a change in emphasis away from long-term skills upgrad-
ing and towards an emphasis on job search. This ‘More People at Work’
reform sought to simplify activation around a ‘one string system’ (so that those
claiming unemployment insurance and social assistance receive similar
services), emphasizing more direct routes into work (Larsen and Mailand
).
The policy reform process that started in  also saw the emergence of
new forms of governance in activation. Existing tripartite bodies were
reformed and  new Regional Labour Market Councils (RARs) – coordi-
nated by the PES but with equal membership from social partner (employer
and trade union) organizations and local authorities (‘municipalities’) – were
established to plan activation for people entitled to unemployment insurance
benefits. Programme content for this client group was agreed on an annual
basis between RARs and the government LabourMarket Authority (LMA), in
accordance with nationally set guidelines. However, RARs were granted
some latitude in terms of setting their own ‘tools and targets’ – the precise
content of activation; and additional target groups and areas where resources
should be channelled. RARs also managed the contracting-out of some ser-
vices. Meanwhile  local authorities, mainly through their social services
departments, led the delivery of activation services for the social assistance
claimants between  and . After , multipartite Local Coordina-
tion Committees (drawing representation from trade unions, employers and
community organizations) advised local authorities on the content of activa-
tion, but lacked the power of RARs to directly influence ‘tools and targets’.
The  reorganization of local government in Denmark had important
consequences for the governance of activation. Existing regional PES and
RAR structures were wound up. PES and local authority-led service centres
were amalgamated in  one-stop-shop ‘jobcentres’. Four new ‘state-region’-
level Employment Councils have been charged with ensuring cohesion
between the national and regional employment policy, while Local Employ-
ment Councils (covering each of the  integrated jobcentre areas) advise on
the delivery of activation. However, despite similar interest groups being
represented in these new local and ‘super-region’ bodies, the decision-making
authority and influence enjoyed by RARs has been lost. The targeting and
resourcing of activation is now the remit of jobcentre managers alone, based
on annual performance agreements with the LMA.
Denmark’s experience with the contracting-out of activation has been
variable. Long-standing arrangements that outsourced some services to
further education providers were rapidly expanded after the ‘More People at
Work’ reform and by  there were  recognized activation providers
nationally,  of which were private companies (Lindsay and Mailand ).
The same year saw the proportion of unemployment insurance benefit claim-
ants referred to contracted-out providers peak at  per cent. However,
administrative pressures associated with the introduction of jobcentres and
budget limitations have recently curtailed contracting-out, so that by 
only  per cent of job-seekers were served by contracted providers
(Bredgaard ).
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Case study methodology
The aim of the case study research was to draw on the views of national,
regional and local stakeholders to analyse the operation and impact of
Denmark’s regional and local governance structures established from ;
consider the potential impact of further moves towards the localization of
management and delivery structures; and assess how processes of contracting-
out have affected activation.
The research was conducted in mid- and involved, first, in-depth,
face-to-face interviews with representatives of national-level policy stakehold-
ers: the government LMA; the Trades Union Congress (Landsorganisationen
i Danmark, or LO); and the main national employers’ confederation (Dansk
Arbejdsgiverforening, or DA). The research also involved interviews with
regional-level stakeholders involved in ‘Greater Copenhagen’ RAR (which, at
that time, was still planning and managing activation services in collaboration
with the PES in the Greater Copenhagen area) and in the delivery of specific
services within the city. Interviews were undertaken with those representing:
regional PES management; the regional-level LO; the regional-level DA; a
local authority-level activation provider; and two employers who had offered
supported work placements for the unemployed through local initiatives. In
total, data were gathered from ten in-depth interviews – a relatively small
number, but taking in senior managers and policy officers within all relevant
key stakeholders. Interviews generally lasted for – minutes, and covered:
the roles and priorities of stakeholder organizations within governance struc-
tures; perceived benefits and limitations of approaches to governance; rela-
tionships with other stakeholders; and views on the appropriateness and
effectiveness of the content of activation policy.
Findings from the Danish case study research
New governance and locally responsive services. The research highlighted a number
of strengths associated with regional/local governance structures operating
between  and . National, regional and local stakeholders considered
the RAR structures to have been successful in improving the planning and
delivery of activation. Reviewing the operation of the Greater Copenhagen
and other RARs, a national-level trade union respondent reported ‘genuine
partnership working . . . the agencies involved have proved willing to compromise and accept
different roles’.
One of the main advantages associated with Denmark’s regional structures
appears to have been that – within clearly defined parameters – key stake-
holders were able to discuss, influence and agree targeted local responses. In
negotiations with the National LMA on annual plans, RARs were granted a
degree of freedom in defining ‘target groups and tools’ (i.e. the targeting of
additional resources on specific, particularly disadvantaged client groups
and/or specific programme options). For example, in the case of Greater
Copenhagen, respondents described instances where additional resources
had been directed towards addressing the needs of minority ethnic groups
(reflecting the relative ethnic diversity of the local labour market).
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Crucially, by ceding power and sharing responsibility for the planning,
funding and targeting of activation with employers and trade unions (as well
as local authorities), the Danish government ensured that these organizations
had a stake in, and sense of responsibility for, seeing that programmes worked.
Government officials and PES managers participating in our research
acknowledged the benefits in terms of ‘credibility’ of having employers’ and
trade unions’ support for activation programmes that they themselves had had
a role in planning and funding.
‘It was important that we gained the support of employer and trade union organiza-
tions. It meant that we could go to employers and say “Look – we have their support
on this”. It adds credibility.’ (Regional PES manager – PES representative
on RAR)
Interviewees accepted that the RAR model was not a panacea for the prob-
lems of planning and implementing activation. For example, with ‘consensus’
central to the culture and ethos of RARs, prevailing ideas and policies rarely
appear to have been fundamentally challenged by non-governmental actors.
Furthermore, there are inherent difficulties in identifying links between gov-
ernance structures and the performance of specific activation programmes
(and indeed changes in unemployment). In the case of Denmark, these prob-
lems are exacerbated by the manner in which new activation programmes
were introduced at the same time as regional governance structures. Never-
theless, it is clear that a number of programmes directed towards unemploy-
ment insurance beneficiaries (and developed through RARs between 
and ) have reported significant positive employment effects (Kvist and
Pedersen ). Evaluations have also suggested that RARs were effective in
providing a focus for information and practice-sharing and promoting more
locally responsive activation (Larsen et al. ).
Our interviews were conducted prior to the roll-out of Denmark’s jobcentre
reform, and therefore focused on the regional-level devolution established
from  rather than the process of further localization to municipality level
then being planned. However, regional and national stakeholders were
divided as to the potential value of the process of localization started in .
Some social partner and PES representatives were concerned that, given the
limited capacity of smaller local authorities and the narrow geographical focus
implied by the process of localization, there might be problems in arriving at
coherent area-based approaches. However, the same respondents often sug-
gested that considerable benefits could flow from the process of localization –
the hope is that local authorities’ and PES staff will be better able to combine
their different areas of expertise, and unemployed people receiving different
benefits (unemployment insurance and social assistance) will have access to
more consistent services.
More recent research on the impact of the process of localization suggests
that some of the problems predicted by key stakeholders have materialized.
There have been difficulties in integrating key agencies at the local level, while
employers in particular have shown little interest in local advisory partner-
ships, which lack the genuine influence and decision-making authority once
S P & A, V. , No. , O 
©  The Author(s) 
Journal Compilation ©  Blackwell Publishing Ltd
held by RARs (Lindsay andMailand ). Meanwhile, jobcentres themselves
remain largely divided between PES areas dealing with unemployment insur-
ance clients1 and local authorities’ areas for social assistance clients – as a
result, there have been few opportunities for practice-sharing (Bredgaard
).
‘A dual system will still be in place [in most jobcentres]. There will be two client
groups, two managements, a municipality clients’ desk and a PES clients’ desk.’
(National LMA representative)
Furthermore, a recurring concern in interviews with key stakeholders – that
a shift towards localized provision and the resulting dispersal of some PES
officers and managers from regional to local centres could result in a loss of
capacity and expertise – also appears to have been well founded. Recent
reviews of the jobcentre reform process have noted that a ‘shake-out’ of
PES staff has indeed followed, and the loss of experienced managers and
professionals may have contributed to recent sharp declines in organiza-
tional performance across the jobcentre network (Lindsay and Mailand
).
Contracting-out in activation. For a representative of the government’s LMA
participating in our research, there were benefits in the expansion of the role
of ‘other actors’ in activation. Private and community sector organizations
could, it was argued, add value by delivering specialist services. A number of
interviewees also noted how contracting-out had initially been developed in a
manner that allowed for a continuing role for social partners. Trade union
representatives at the national and regional level described a pragmatic
approach to the government’s agenda on extending contractualism – trade
unions have criticized the lack of clear evidence that contracting-out delivers
better outcomes, but affiliate organizations have themselves become delivery
agents (at the time of the research, more than one-fifth of all Denmark’s
contracted providers were trade union-affiliated). A regional LO representa-
tive explained trade unions’ thinking on the issue:
‘We were originally against privatization [of activation]. But when it happened we
had to respond, so all the unions in our region came together to form a company to act
in the private activation market. We were against it, but this is the reality, and we have
tried to make a contribution for the benefit of our members and our organization.’
(Regional policy officer, LO)
However, both PES and trade union representatives argued for a more
rigorous analysis of the outcomes achieved by contracting-out. According to a
national-level trade union representative: ‘Now we need to focus on performance,
ensuring that companies deliver, not just ensuring that there is a market.’ Both trade union
and employer representatives also consistently stressed the value of a gradually
increasing role for other actors, based on the objective of ‘adding value’ to
existing services. There were concerns that a ‘rush to privatization’ could lead
to inconsistencies in the quality of services.
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More recent research by Lindsay and Mailand () suggests that many of
the concerns raised by some of our interviewees (and especially some PES
and trade union representatives) regarding contracting-out were justified.
The combination of contracting-out with an increasing ‘Work First’ approach
initially produced a system of outcome-oriented funding for external contrac-
tors that mainly incentivized the achievement of quick job outcomes. As a
result budgets have come under pressure as service providers have quickly
achieved targets by assisting the most able first. These design flaws, along with
the heavy administrative burden associated with managing contracts, and the
reduced administrative capacity within the PES that has been a by-product of
integrated jobcentres, have seen a rapid decline in contracting-out since .
Perhaps more importantly, there appears to be evidence that the combi-
nation of the financial disruption resulting from poorly designed outcome-
oriented payment systems, and the dislocation caused by the simultaneous
attempt to institute a major reform of local jobcentre services, has negatively
affected the quality of basic activation services, at least in the short term.
Meanwhile, transaction and administrative costs have remained stubbornly
high (Bredgaard and Larsen ); while recent evaluation evidence suggests
that anticipated cost savings from contracting-out remain largely unknown
and undocumented (Bredgaard and Larsen ). As Bredgaard (: )
notes: ‘it is impossible to evaluate the efficiency of this market at present,
either in terms of cost-effectiveness or employment effects. There have been
high levels of information asymmetry and transaction costs. As a result, both
transparency and freedom of choice have been reduced.’
To conclude, from the mid-s, Denmark established apparently effec-
tive regional governance structures for activation, before shifting towards a
more localized model of planning and delivery since . The prioritization
of more consistent ‘one string’ services and integrated jobcentres may result in
more locally responsive activation. There is also a pragmatic consensus that
contracting-out has the potential to promote individually focused, specialist
services. However, attempts to rapidly expand contracting-out while simulta-
neously localizing employment services have undermined capacity (partly due
to the dispersal of the professional expertise of the PES and other agencies
across almost  local authorities). Of perhaps greater concern is that recent
reforms have dismantled RAR partnerships, which saw government share
decision-making authority with employers, trade unions and local authorities;
and which therefore promoted a sense of ‘ownership’, ‘buy-in’ and responsi-
bility among these stakeholders.
The Netherlands: Contractualism and the Hollowing-out
of Public Employment Services
Background
The Netherlands’ labour market policy institutions have experienced a
process of rapid and almost constant reform since the s. As Borghi and
Van Berkel (a: ) note, ‘reforms did not follow a blueprint that was clear
from the outset’, resulting in an erratic and at times contradictory process of
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policy development. Tripartite institutions that gave social partners an impor-
tant role in the administration of unemployment insurance benefits, and
latterly the management of the PES, were first established and then dissolved.
A process of marketization starting in the s saw insurance fund organi-
zations and local authorities (dealing with unemployment insurance and social
assistance claimants, respectively) required to purchase activation services in a
new market, which was initially dominated by the PES as a key national
provider (Struyven and Steurs ). However, the Netherlands was soon to
emerge as a leading state in promoting the use of the private sector to deliver
public employment services. The rapid growth of private provision, fuelled by
the contracting-out of PES functions, has led to the emergence of a ‘pluriform
reintegration market’ (OECD ).
The government’s determination to establish a more consistent approach
to the delivery of benefits and services saw the rapid amalgamation of the
Netherlands’ five ‘uvi’ social insurance agencies within a new centralized
institution for the administration of contributions-based benefits – the Admin-
istrative Agency for Employees’ Insurance (UWV). The  ‘SUWI’ Act
(meaning ‘implementation structure for work and income’) established the
UWV – functioning under the control of the Ministry of Social Affairs and
Employment – as the single management body for activation for unemploy-
ment insurance beneficiaries. However, this shift towards the centralized
administration of benefits was unusual during a period when successive gov-
ernments promoted the establishment of integrated local jobcentres (‘Centres
for Work and Income’) and contracting-out of centrally managed PES pro-
grammes as a means of delivering more locally and individually focused
services. Local authorities have remained in charge of benefits and services for
social assistance claimants, while a reform to funding mechanisms has given
each municipality total autonomy over the delivery of activation services, but
also total financial responsibility for benefits budgets.
Since , activation and support services previously led by the PES have
been subject to a series of privatizations, and since  the role of the PES
(now known as Centres for Work and Income) has been largely limited to
gatekeeping – registering clients, assessing their ‘distance’ from the labour
market, and providing basic job-matching and employability services for the
most able during their first six months of unemployment (Van Berkel ).
The UWV and local authorities act as funders, while the government has
insisted that  per cent of services purchased by the UWV (and, until
recently, the majority of those purchased by local authorities) are delivered by
the private sector. With local authorities facing considerable financial pres-
sures and private contractors competing on the basis of job outcome targets,
it has been suggested that the Netherlands’ shift towards marketization has
also seen an increasing prioritization of ‘Work First’ (Sol and Hoogstanders
).
Case study methodology
The case study research involved in-depth, face-to-face interviews with
national-level representatives of the government’s Ministry of Social Affairs
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and Employment and the PES; the national representative body for local
authority social services managers; and the national office of the UWV.
Further interviews were undertaken with stakeholders in ‘South-West Neth-
erlands’ and its main city (Rotterdam), including representatives of: PES and
UWV regional management; the Municipality of Rotterdam; and a major,
Rotterdam-based private sector activation provider. Data were gathered from
ten in-depth interviews. Dutch social partner organizations play no direct role
in the governance of activation (unlike their counterparts in Denmark) and so
were not represented. Interviews mirrored the format of those conducted in
Denmark: lasting – minutes; and deploying a similar discussion guide. As
with our research in Denmark, it is important to acknowledge that inter-
viewees inevitably reflected the priorities and values of their own organiza-
tions, but also that we were able to compare and critically assess the views of
senior managers/policy officers within all the key funding and delivery agen-
cies involved in activation.
Findings from the Netherlands case study research
New governance and locally responsive services. The Dutch government’s reforms to
the governance of activation, culminating in the SUWI Act, have established
a clear purchaser/provider split in services. But at the same time, joint
‘Centres for Work and Income’ have been established, bringing together staff
from the PES, and the two funder/purchaser organizations: the UWV and
local authorities. The aim is to establish a ‘job chain’ in which a number of key
stakeholder organizations are required to work towards a ‘comprehensive
approach’ to the delivery of activation services for the unemployed.
• PES staff assist claimants of both contributions-based and income-based
benefits to complete claims, which are then forwarded to the UWV and
relevant local authorities, respectively, for administration. The other initial
key role for PES staff involves the assessment of clients’ employability (and
providing limited support services for those assessed as not facing major
barriers to work).
• Those clients assessed as job-ready are assisted by PES staff with job-
matching activities. Clients failing to make a successful transition in –
months (depending on duration thresholds applied to different client
groups) then become the responsibility of activation or ‘reintegration’
programme funders (either the UWV or the relevant local authority). All
clients assessed by PES officers as not being job-ready at the start of the
process are immediately referred to the UWV or local authority for rein-
tegration services.
• UWV and local authorities’ caseworkers (also located in Centres for Work
and Income) then work with clients to identify and purchase appropriate
services, usually referring clients to training provision or work placements.
As noted above, all UWV-funded services must be contracted out, with the
majority purchased from private contractors. Local authorities have
always had more latitude, and since  have been able to buy services in
the public or private sector, or deliver their own interventions.
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All key stakeholders interviewed for the research were committed to the
Centres for Work and Income approach, and strongly advocated the contin-
ued co-location and integration of agencies in an attempt to promote more
individually focused services. PES, UWV and local authority representatives
highlighted the value of Centres for Work and Income in presenting unem-
ployed clients with a ‘one stop’ service. Some Centres for Work and Income
have also piloted a ‘single employer service point’, with PES, UWV and local
authority staff forming one team with the responsibility to engage employers
and match job-seekers to vacancies.
Nevertheless, PES managers acknowledged that they were not yet ‘equal
partners’ in deciding clients’ future trajectories, and funders (UWV and local
authorities) sometimes expressed scepticism about PES officers’ expertise in
assessing clients’ barriers to work, advising on activation and carrying out the
initial stages of benefits administration (all supposedly important roles for
the PES). While there has been no comprehensive evaluation of the impact of
the introduction of Centres for Work and Income, previous reviews of the
Dutch employment service reforms have similarly pointed to problems asso-
ciated with the lack of a clearer role for the PES, which is ‘not allowed to
provide intensive job counselling or training’ and faces criticism over the
‘quality of [client] assessments’ (De Koning : –). Activation funders
(local authorities in particular) have consistently raised doubts about the level
of service provided by the ‘slimmed down’ PES (PricewaterhouseCoopers
). The extent to which Centres for Work and Income have delivered
more locally responsive services has also been questioned. As Van Berkel
() notes, the rationalization of a formerly more extensive PES network
into around  Centres for Work and Income has reduced the local reach of
employment services, while regularly requiring municipalities to join together
under a single ‘service level agreement’ covering Centre for Work and Income
services (usually agreed between the PES and the largest local authority within
the area in question). Such processes of standardization appear to run counter
to the local flexibility promised.
So there appear to have been barriers to the development of the genuine
partnership working that is key to the emergence of integrated local services.
The exclusion of the PES from directly funding and managing the Nether-
lands’ main activation programmes means that its professionals are seen as
lacking a clear stake (and expertise) in making activation work on the ground.
Terpstra (), assessing the development of Centres for Work and Income,
has argued that the ‘symbiotic inter-dependency’ that characterizes genuine
partnership working – that is, the shared reliance on each other’s resources
and expertise to achieve mutually valued outcomes – has not always been
apparent. Our findings appear to support Terpstra’s critique.
Contracting-out in activation. Among PES, UWV and local authority stakehold-
ers there were concerns that the individually focused services that are often
seen as a key benefit of contracting-out have yet to materialize. Even national
government representatives – while arguing that there were some indications
of increasing flexibility – acknowledged disappointment at the lack of inno-
vative practice. Local authority and PES representatives went further, sug-
S P & A, V. , No. , O 
 ©  The Author(s)
Journal Compilation ©  Blackwell Publishing Ltd
gesting that private companies, seeking rationalization and economies of
scale, had increasingly standardized their approaches.
‘With flexibility, the results have not been overwhelming so far. It’s a disappointment
that the development of a free market with new products and new approaches has been
very limited. The companies grow towards one approach rather than diverse
approaches. The bids are repetitive and not innovative.’ (Local authority repre-
sentative, Rotterdam)
These findings concur with previous evaluations of contracting-out, which
have criticized the standardization of services among providers seeking to
minimize costs (Van Berkel and Van der Aa ). Furthermore, with local
authorities responsible for financing activation for social assistance claimants,
there is a strong incentive both to minimize spending (resulting in substantial
underspends in many municipality areas), and to promote ‘Work First’ initia-
tives that seek to move the more able into work quickly. A representative of
the national body for local authority social services managers (DIVOSA)
acknowledged that these processes had produced a ‘culture of caution’ in
activation. Nevertheless, one local authority representative welcomed the
greater sense of control resulting from contracting-out. It was suggested that
previous in-house programmes had sometimes been maintained despite
limited evidence of their effectiveness. Such programmes ‘reversed normal
economic principles’ by operating whether the outcomes sought were
achieved or not, whereas it was suggested that contracting-out has allowed
local authorities to focus on ‘what works’.
A national government interviewee also remained optimistic that a more
flexible and ‘modular’ approach to purchasing activation would emerge from
the recent introduction of Individual Reintegration Accounts (IROs). IROs
allow job-seekers and their case workers to jointly control a ‘personalized
budget’ to purchase tailored services – around three-quarters of UWV clients
had access to IROs in .
‘Both the UWV and the municipalities tend to be moving away from purchasing “head
to tail” trajectories. Now they tend to be more active in case management. They have
their own case managers who purchase different parts of trajectories.’ (Ministry of
Social Affairs and Employment representative)
A private sector provider based in Rotterdam acknowledged the value of the
IRO approach in providing the client with a sense of ownership and choice,
and in ‘encouraging openness and creativity on the part of both the client and
the adviser’, but also argued that additional resources would be required
to make the system work effectively. Nevertheless, these findings appear to
concur with previous studies that have found that ‘the job seeker’s right to
have a say’ was a genuine driving force behind the introduction of IROs, and
that the resulting ‘increased level of involvement of the individual’ can
produce positive outcomes (Sol and Westerveld : ). Evaluations have
suggested that IROs have positively impacted on both job entry and sustain-
ability rates (Van Berkel ).
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Interviewees also hoped that the shift towards a more individualized
approach would result in a more efficient market. National government,
UWV and local authorities’ representatives all accepted that there had been
substantial transaction costs associated with contracting-out. The limited
experience of local authorities in particular (and indeed some new contractor
organizations) in methods of outsourcing initially resulted in costly, over-
complex contractual models. Further evidence of the Netherlands’ highly
bureaucratic processes of contracting-out has been detailed elsewhere (Sol
and Hoogstanders ).
Finally, PES managers acknowledged that there were dangers in the whole-
sale contracting-out of services. There were concerns that the hollowing-out of
PES functions – limiting its role to ‘gatekeeping and signposting’ rather than
directly engaging with clients in need of individually focused support – had the
potential to undermine the ‘institutionalized knowledge’ once held within the
public sector. PES managers (and some other national-level stakeholders) also
noted the potential for contracting-out to open the way to greater inconsis-
tencies in the quality of services at the local level. Evaluations of the impact
of PES privatization in the Netherlands have raised similar concerns.
Contracting-out, combined with rationalization processes as part of the devel-
opment of Centres for Work and Income, has seen a shake-out of former PES
staff (and arguably the loss/dispersal of the expertise in activation once held
within the PES). There were substantial redundancies within the PES as a
result of the Centres for Work and Income reform, while the private activation
company that emerged from the privatization of PES training services had
gone into liquidation by  (Van Berkel ).
Like other aspects of the Netherlands’ experiment in privatizing and local-
izing activation, the contracting-out of many PES functions and the establish-
ment of a ‘reintegration market’ have proved a limited success. The drive
towards marketization has increased the range of actors involved in the
delivery of activation and there has been a specific attempt to develop more
individually focused approaches, but the promised innovation and dynamism
has so far proved more difficult to achieve. Centres for Work and Income
represent an attempt to develop more joined-up, locally responsive services,
but the hollowing-out of expertise in dealing with clients’ problems once held
within the PES (alongside the dominance of contractual models) has limited
the effectiveness of attempts to promote partnership-based approaches to
delivering local activation.
Discussion
Both Denmark and the Netherlands have pursued reforms characterized by
what Borghi and Van Berkel (a, b) identify as defining features of the
new governance in activation – a shift towards regional/local approaches
involving a range of stakeholders; and (especially in the Netherlands) the
contracting-out of services previously provided by the public sector. The
drivers leading to the increasing influence of these new forms of governance
have been similar to those in other policy arenas: dissatisfaction with
‘traditional’ modes of governance in addressing the complex needs of
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disadvantaged individuals and areas; an acknowledgement of the potential for
non-state actors to add value in addressing these needs; and a drive to improve
the efficiency, quality and impact of services (in this case by promoting more
individually focused and locally responsive provision).
Processes of localization, and particularly the establishment of multi-
agency, integrated jobcentres, have transformed services in both countries. In
Denmark, the government has argued that its new local authority-level, inte-
grated jobcentre model will ensure greater consistency in the quality of indi-
vidually focused services that are more responsive to local labour markets.
The shift towards a ‘one string’ system that equally values services for claim-
ants of unemployment insurance and social assistance benefits is welcome,
and the co-location of PES and local authorities’ staff may eventually improve
practice-sharing. But the Danish experience demonstrates how co-location
does not always lead to effective collaboration in the short term, and in many
areas jobcentres represent little more than shared office space. The jobcentre
reform has also led to a diminution in the capacity of the PES. PES expertise
has arguably been spread too thinly across Denmark’s local authorities, while
redundancies and disaffection have led to a ‘shake-out’ of experienced staff –
problems that have directly impacted on services.
The Netherlands has also moved towards a localized, integrated jobcentre
model. There are similar potential benefits linked to joint working between the
PES and key activation funders. There is again justification in seeking to
ensure a consistent level of service for claimants of different benefits. However,
the PES has experienced staff reductions and found itself marginalized in
decision-making on the funding of activation and the appropriateness of
trajectories for individuals. This hollowing-out of the PES’s capacity and
expertise has been accentuated by the privatization of activation services that
it once delivered (Lindsay and McQuaid ). The PES has been largely
restricted to the roles of gatekeeper and assessor, but even here programme
funders are sceptical of the value added by an organization now perceived as
having limited expertise, few dealings with disadvantaged job-seekers and no
direct stake in the success of activation.
Indeed, both countries have sometimes struggled to promote localized
cooperation on activation. Genuine partnership working requires a willing-
ness to share resources and ‘ownership’ over the content and direction of
policy, and a belief in the need to cooperate in order to achieve shared goals.
In the Netherlands, Centres for Work and Income have yet to create such a
sense of shared ownership, while the ‘single purchaser’ contractual model
established by recent reforms means that activation funders tend to act uni-
laterally, with limited scope for input to decision-making from the PES or
other stakeholders. Between  and , Danish policy-makers appeared
to have arrived at a regional partnership model that, while sometimes too
consensus-oriented, allowed the PES and national government to share some
decision-making authority with local authorities and social partners. Devolv-
ing a degree of ‘concrete authority’ to regional partnerships created a sense of
shared ownership over, and responsibility for the success of, activation; and
helped legitimize programmes in the eyes of both employers and job-seekers.
The abolition of these regional partnerships as a by-product of further local-
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ization threatens the progress made in joint-working on the planning of acti-
vation, while as yet there is limited evidence of improved cooperation at the
operational level.
Both countries have also pursued contracting-out as a means of promoting
more individually focused services. Yet contractual processes have often been
characterized by the lack of a coherent logic for how external providers can
add value. As Sol and Westerveld (: ) note: ‘sometimes it seems as
though . . . contractualism is more often induced by discontent due to the
poor performance of the old system than by the virtues in the practice of the
new’. Denmark’s somewhat chaotic attempt to grow the market for activation
saw the rapid expansion and then contraction of contracted-out provision due
to poorly designed financial reward systems. In the Netherlands, there is also
evidence of some local authorities abandoning contracting-out in favour of a
return to in-house provision (Van Berkel ). But in some ways the Neth-
erlands has gone much further, contracting out many basic services still
delivered by the PES in Denmark (and most other EU countries), and impos-
ing the private sector as provider for the majority of services. Our research in
both countries highlights how contractualism has sometimes led to standard-
ization rather than innovation and consistent problems around high transac-
tion costs. Only with the emergence of IROs in the Netherlands have we
begun to see evidence of how the right funding model for contracting-out can
promote innovation in responding to individuals’ needs.
Conclusion
Denmark and the Netherlands have, to some extent, sought out similar
solutions to the reform of activation, but practice on the ground has continued
to be influenced by welfare cultures and traditions – a process that Borghi and
Van Berkel (a) call ‘path-dependent convergence’. The Netherlands has
seen a hollowing-out of the PES and an increasing role for contractualism, so
that (despite the country’s corporatist traditions) social partners have been
almost entirely excluded from the planning and management of activation.
Denmark’s long-standing social-democratic traditions and well-established
social partnership institutions mean that the PES has been able to retain a key
role, and trade unions and employers continue to be consulted (although they
are no longer able to directly influence funding decisions). In the Netherlands,
the wholesale privatization of PES provision took place in an atmosphere
where there was consensus around the ineffectiveness of state institutions and
a desire to reduce the role of public agencies in addressing unemployment
(Borghi and Van Berkel a; Van Berkel ); again, the assumptions
underlying the Danish welfare model mean that it has been much more
difficult to make the case for hollowing out the PES.
What these cases do share is a drive towards localizing and contracting out
activation. In both countries, such new forms of governance have seen PES
agencies increasingly concerned with ‘gatekeeping and signposting’ rather
than the direct delivery of individually focused services for those job-seekers in
need of support. Both countries have also seen local authorities emerge as
increasingly dominant players in the activation agenda. This process has been
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particularly clear in the Netherlands, where local authorities have gained
complete control over social assistance activation, but are also totally account-
able for financing social assistance benefits – a change that has informed
increasingly aggressive ‘Work First’ approaches.
There are clear potential benefits associated with a more significant role
for local authorities and the private and third sectors in activation, if and
when these stakeholders can add value to existing approaches. Nevertheless,
in both Denmark and the Netherlands there remains a danger that the
dismantling of robust PES-led services in favour of localized provision or
large-scale contracting-out will lead to inconsistencies in the quality of ser-
vices, exposing the most disadvantaged to greater social risk. With much of
the expertise once held by the PES now transferred to the private sector in
the Netherlands, and key public agencies such as the UWV and local
authorities largely managing contracts rather than working with clients,
there is a danger that the public sector will suffer a loss of crucial institu-
tionalized knowledge – the knowledge of ‘what’s needed’ and ‘what works’
that only comes from direct engagement with clients and service providers
on the ground. In Denmark, while contractualism is less influential, the
dispersal of PES expertise and implied leadership role for local authorities
threatens a similar loss of institutionalized knowledge and raises questions
about the capacity of a new, localized governance to deliver consistency in
the quality of activation.
Rather than challenging only PES organizations ‘to define more clearly
what their . . . role and added value in the market is’ (CEC : ), future
formulations of the EES and member states’ National Reform Programmes
need to be similarly robust in testing the added value of different models of
contractualism and governance within specific policy contexts. Processes of
progressive de-monopolization have the potential to deliver more locally
responsive, individually focused services, but there is also a case to be made for
a continuing role for strong PES organizations in the management and (where
appropriate) delivery of activation. Effective PES organizations, which are
empowered to lead but also required to share resources and decision-making
authority, should remain an essential component of future initiatives for
promoting labour market inclusion.
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Note
. From January  Denmark’s PES (or Arbejdsformidlingen) ceased to exist as a
separate organization. The term ‘PES’ when used in the discussion of post-
policy therefore refers to the state/central government-run services within inte-
grated jobcentres.
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